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RELIEF SOUGHT ON ^PPEAL
Gleave

seeks

to have

the| jury verdict

Howeverf Gleave seeks to have the case remanded
issues:
A.

To award prejudgment interest
on loss of earning capacity.

B.

For a trial on the limited issue
of punitive damages.

1

upheld.
for two

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gleave does not agree with the Statement of Facts
in Rio Grande's brief•

Gleave's version of the facts will

be set forth in the sections below:

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

AT POINT I,
Rio

Grande

claims

th^t

the

evidence

is

insufficient to support the verdict.
However,

the

evidence

shows

that

this

is

an

extremely hazardous crossing because the motorist cannot see
an oncoming train until about four seconds before impact.
The evidence

further

shows that Gieave took

prudent precautions in crossing the tracks.

all of the
On the other

hand, Rio Grande took no steps to injure safety.
AT POINT II.
Rio Grande claims that one of the jurors (Argyle)
should have been excused because she was acquainted with
Gieave's doctor.
However, we have only a pa|rtial transcript of the
voir dire proceedings.

In the absence of a complete record,

this Court should affirm the trial cd>urt.
AT POINT III^
Rio Grande claims that the trial court erred by
failing to grant a motion for partial summary judgment in
the pre-trial proceedings.

3

However, during the trial, the judge reversed his
earlier position and gave Rio Grande everything it wanted
under

the original

summary

judgment

theory.

Thus, this

issue is moot.
AT POINT IV.
Rio Grande claims error because of comments in
closing argument with respect to witness Woodard.
However, Rio Grande did not correctly
that issue in the trial court.

preserve

Therefore, it is waived.

AT POINT V.
Rio Grande claims error because the trial court
failed to give a seat belt instruction.
However, there was no expert evidence to support
such an instruction.

Therefore, the ruling was correct.
AT POINT VI.

(GLEAVEfS CROSS APPEAL)
The
earning

jury

awarded

capacity.

Gleave

Gleave
has

a

prejudgment interest on that amount.

$275,000.00

for

statutory

right

to

The trial court erred

by failing to allow such prejudgment interest.

4

lost

AT POINT VII ,|
(CLEAVE1 S CROSS APPEAL,)
Cleave

cl^irr^

error

because

t:.e

::..

refused *- • instruct * u^- ^irv ::~ ouni|ti\^ ^..inace?
a t ":..

-

However, Rio Grande tno* ^osr. jte.x
uve

.anus

^ideroe

"w as

danger cue- intersection.

bieav-

;

\.^a^

-u*.

3

me

safety

conscious

of the crossing,

disregaid

t ;t [JUJ:I I J c:

safety will s u ^ ^ o ^ t ^ j n i t - v e damages4

AT P O I N T "V I l l ,
Pic Grandp claims that" •=> ^ e w . : ^ki
a] loca + e

f

^r *

^i-^-r

^ * n Grann

j

Qn e c e s s a r

:ru the: S^a:^

Perhaps
soit.v between P - Grande

111 a In,
100% u

•
. i. 1. c- > w e r ;

~ *

ciga . .st. - -

c

xb

ire * -

^*~ *- * r^

Grande

}

* ~J
•

contribution

<

1

* *- <^f
l,+~ *. * n
1. , ~<iv_r -

1

^

paid,

Rio Grande

c a n si le

5

t h e State

of

Utah

for

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE FROM
WHICH A JURY COULD CONCLUDE THAT
RIO GRANDE WAS 100% NEGLIGENT.
Rio
evidence.

Grande's

first

issue

is an

attack

on

the

Rio Grande argues that Gleave was negligent as a

matter of law.

In the alternative, Rio Grande argues that

there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict. (See
Brief of Appellants, at Point One.)
In support of this issue, Rio Grande resorts to
jury argument.

Rio Grande chooses favorable evidence.

Rio

Grande ignores unfavorable evidence.
However, on appeal, this Court should not weigh
conflicting evidence.

This Court should simply determine if

there is competent evidence in the record to support the
jury verdict.
construe

In making that analysis, the Court should

all inferences

in favor of the jury's verdict.

See, e.g., Stanger v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201
(Utah 1983).
A.

The Evidence Shows That The Railroad Crossing is a
Trap for Motorists.
One

expert

(Mitchell)

was

railroad crossings in Pennsylvania.
all

of

his

experience,

he

had

6

in

charge

of

all

He testified that in

only

seen

three

other

crossings

as

as

the crossing

in

this

case,

A second e x p e r t (Van W a g o n e " 1 •* a ?ff:^d that i t

(R. 1730. )
was

hazardous

the most

. sngerous

^rossina

hp *

looking at thousands of crossings.

.

after

• f-. , ~~ •

I

the

stop

can sen ci iy abou 1

sign

(E , 16 '

)

,-6;* :eeK

• - *•*

By wa^ 0 1 c o m p a r i s o n , M c n t a " * '**4

(1947) jctuies

. ->,-, m a as h a z a r d o u s

.

y

">rth.

*

-'<;.:

...-A*-

away from t h e crospjno cio^-- re*- h a - e an urobst ruct^n ** -^ r
a !:: .-

::)i ICE

requires a rai.rcad tc m a m t a :
I

• rossing ?" t-a* 'r r..*rists

t r 1 1 «r*tec:i i r:i ew foi: 30u letn.
An

train
unti 1

t -. -

wr,cf'D

iogict

T*V.I
r5

'Erey)

~nf r-i r i e r * -

*

t .

(V

»

Or

* •

ro-

I In

' .-* t r a i n

*-^

^

rV^n^rni.-

(See pjct^in.
J

r

.xhibit

•

1_ "

,1 | i
" • - r*

the curving t r a c k , etc
T7 . • • c
testii--.;

..

-ha 4 * .

|

II ,

the

jb,,!
ffte

I1I (

h

' .
~

e

dancer

i in I ij i set I luit,

whistle

- B bpfore

t h e _> - ? r ? e c t i o n .

V

warning

i

^

fO^

test::ie-

would
train
The

SOIlFld
I | |I I I1II II

not
hits

reason
i't

t h e

111 M i l l

I I

(

' "* * • t: f * a

L^^^IL^

'' <=

a

expert

trap

(Van

W.* :rrer )
^n

W a g o n e r explained that a m o t o r i s t can't see the train until

-1""'' E^ ren i£ there w a s n o problem w i t h ai idibility, the train
engineer h a d n o specific recollection o f even b l o w i n g t h e
w h i s t l e u n t i l h e actually s a w t h e c a r as t h e train rounded
the b e n d ,
(R , 1401-1402.) That w o u l d b e about 3 - 4 seconds
before impact,, (See p l a i n t i f f 1 s Exhibi t No. 47 )
;

about four seconds before impact. (R. 1609-1610.)

According

to Van Wagoner, that doesn't give a motorist enough time to
get across the tracks.

On the other hand, that doesn't give

the motorist enough time to stop his vehicle.
motorist is in a trap.

Thus, the

(R. 1588-R. 1593):

Q.

Just to be clear, you said the
probability of an impact is one.
By that do you mean one hundred
percent?

A.

It is a certainty . . . there is no
way that a driver can avoid a
collision.
(R. 1593.)
* * *

A*

Because there is a zone which I
have shown on the diagrams that if
we put a train coming in that zone
at the speeds they travel there,
there is certainty that a collision
will occur when a driver is acting
in a prudent way by stopping at a
traffic control device and looking
down the track . . • <»
(R. 1606.)

In summary, there was substantial evidence that
the railroad crossing is a trap for motorists.
entitled

to

reach

a

conclusion

that

The jury was

Gleave

was

0%

negligent—and that Rio Grande was 100% negligent.
B.

The Evidence Shows That Gleave Met His Duty.
Gleave had a duty of due care.

that he fully met that duty:

8

The evidence shows

Gleave approached the crossing and stopped, at the
)

c *- T

.- • -•

,

•-

1 o o k e c •_ v, *:: .
h^

- riaht

s ; • ••
*-

-*

'

the

wn^i.c

^^

i.

^^

i

looked

back,

f

:

.*
iK-^

to

h a d tc: • m o v e

1 7 60.)

•- -n^ ,

(R,

1eft

a i id

Gleave
the

111 7 5 0 . )

did

left

f<: r
not

to

Gl e a v e

listened

c iI I

conclude

that

G3 e a v e

]:: i: :N zee .• fled
Gleave

I

the

immed i a t e l y

to

ge t

11 l e

But he was h i t b e f o r e h e c o u l d b a c k u p .
short,

hear

t'i: i E; • : a r

J I - aboi it 1 foot from, t h e t r a c k s ,

• -. •

t r i ed

In

the

see

tl le f::li m e 1 l B z- : i i l ::i :j a t

s t o p p e d , h:.«

s t o p p e d ,r

sJ o ; ; Il }

:i::i • I

1 ooked

Tl le

=• e r y t h i n g

into

(R. 1 ; 6 5 . )
both

ji ill :: ]
that

car

a

ways ,

• :: • :: "i :i Il ::i

€ -a s i ] y

reasonable ,

II l e :
Rio Grande r e s p o n d s

Gleave hac
a

the

.%fcti bacl i: t o

t - -j- r-

reverse.

Gleave

f t h € • :: o n d :i t :i o i I ::> f t: 1 i <s !:: :i :

J

f L

train

1760.)
•

; "

After stopping , he

]! 3 I i s t a s h e s t a r t e d f o r w a r d ,

IOOWPH

* 3,

17 5 8, ) "

- -1' *

t o a l ] of

- • stop twice.

^ o.

ct

I .1 i€

t l i i s by s a y i n g

Once a t t h e s t o p

I ' .1 u: esl: IC II • 3

:: f

1 .1 :n =

that

sign—and
!:::ii: acks •

I ! il : >

Grand*, says a motorist can get across the tracks safely by
, ief
G O m p d i *-*

of Appel lant,

at p. j. u.

-o : ~ rv. b .

—
Rio Gra nde repeatedly argue & .i^-,
policeman that he slowed but did not stop for the stop sign.
(Brief of Appellant, at pp. 1 0 a:
:- . .- sufficient to
say that the ]ury rejected that version of the evidence.
At trial, Gleave testified that he did stop. There was also
an independent witness who saw the accident and corroborated
Mr," G l e a v e 1 s testimony that Gleave did stop. (P 1 813-1814.)

9

The short answer is simply that the jury rejected this
version

of

the

evidence.

The

jury

believed

plaintiff's

expert (Van Wagoner) who testified that it is impossible for
a car to cross the tracks safely (see above).
Furthermore,
presence

of

expectancies.

the

Van

Wagoner

existing

stop

testified
sign

that

violates

the

driver

In other words, a driver who stops at the

stop sign, expects that it is then safe to proceed across
the tracks without making any further stops.

(R. 1588-1589,

1606.)
In summary, it was entirely reasonable for Gleave
to stop once at at the stop sign.

If someone wanted him to

stop twice, they should have put in two stop signs.
C.

Evidence of Rio Grande's Breach of Duty.
Rio Grande's brief bristles with argument about

Gleave's duty.

Rio Grande argues that Gleave has a duty to

stop, look, listen, etc.

We concede that a motorist does

have such duties—and the jury was so instructed.

(R. 733,

738, 740, 741, 743.)
However, Pio Grande also has a duty of due care.
Rio Grande's duty of due care

includes

inter

alia, the

following:
First, Rio Grande had a duty to remove weeds which
interfered

with

vision.

See,

e.g.,

Coastline R.R. Co., 241 S.E.2d 158
R. 735 and § 41-6-19, Utah Code Ann.

10

Lowery

v.

(S.C. 1978).

Seabord
Compare

Second,

Ri o

precaution?-

Grande

'^--hazardous

Hobbs v . Denvei
(Utah 1 9 8 4 ) .

^ .-,

uranae

at a reasoriaon-

i I "I i in 'I1, i

speer.

:jet

11;'l,-'

r

Pac. Cc , : J. r. - * -

^xtra

See,

"^2-

r ..-

M,

Northern,

I

p£rij',^tj_i

Denkers

+•_ 111 -i

!• r p j n

v. Southern

1918)? S t . Louis B,R. C o ,

Penningtons

Compar e P

to tnVp

crossing.

western

.

Burlington

duty

(Compare R. "V-«t

r

v,

had a

•• • P. 2d

(Ai I'

1 '* "' 7) ;

982,, 990

Runkle

(Mont,

v.

1980).

7 12 .
There !

-

evidence that R i o Grande burned weeds,

iheie is> ii o-'ifl^p-.- that Rio Grande reduced the
s peed :i £ i t s train s
Pio
(I »:

G r and e
Il 33 3

did

I! 3 3 1

a ny t h i ng
1 33 8 )

Ther e i s no ev idence tha t

(I !: II 5 9 9 )
at

a 11

!: :::: • a vo i d

ace i d e n t,
av en

Indeed, 1 .he ei lgd i leer da • ::! i I :: • t

apply the brakes until after he hi t the car,,
1N 1 I ,1

th I s

(R , ] 4 1 0 -

Hnncp, the jur ] • was completely justified in finding

that Riu Grande w a c L00% i legligent,
POINT I I .
RIO GRANDE f S CLAIMS OF
AN IRREGULARITY IN T H E
JURY SELECTION A R E PURE
CONJECTURE,
Ii I I I
patient

of

i ' i diu l c

m^

3/
—• Denver \ *
own speed , *M .
state statute
P

i (iiiiii|| I i l l

I II1111

i i t IH-« ^ i l l n e s s e s

| mi i i ni

(Glea^t-'s

'. i q I r

treating

was

a

doctor),.

Granae wtssu^i:- r^iiroad Company seu& * u^
There are no municipal regulations or
,„et train speed.
(R. 1316 and

11

Ric Grande claims that bias, therefore, crept into the jury
selection process.

Specifically, Rio Grande claims that the

jury was not introduced to Dr. Mendenhall during the voir
dire.

(Brief of Appellant, Point II.)
In support thereof, Rio Grande cites a portion of

the reporter's transcript of the voir dire.

However, the

problem is that the court reporter only transcribed a small
portion

of

those

proceedings.

Dr. Mendenhall1 s name was

(R.

presented

1672.)
to

the

Thereafter,
jury

unreported portion of the voir dire proceedings.
2038.)

This portion of the Record

in the

(R. 2037-

is included

here as

Exhibit A.
Where the Record is not complete, it is uniformly
held

that the judgment below shouLd be affirmed.

Federal Savings & Loan v. Schamanek, 684 P. 2d 1257

First
(Utah

1984); Bevan v. J.H. Const. Co., 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983);
Rutter v. McLaughlin, 612 P.2d 135 (Idaho 1980).
Gleave submits that the procedural flaw is fatal.
However, this Court might be inclined to look beyond the
procedural flaw.
of the issue.

Therefore, Gleave has briefed the merits

Since those arguments are only of peripheral

interest, and since they are not necessary to decide this
appeal, they are contained in a separate appendix.
Exhibit B.)
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(See

POINT I I I .
AN Y ERROR IN T H E SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RULINGS IS MOOT BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT REVERSED ITS POSITION AT
TRIAI ,.
R i o Grai ide mo ve ::i f :::: :i : : summar y
trial

Its theory w a s that State government had exclusive

j .. . - .
railroad

jiidg n t.ei i !:::: pr :i < :):t:: i :•

it, (preemptd on)
cro s s ings .

The

:i) ? ei:
tr I a ]

t::l: ie

s i gi is

a i i ::i s:i iina] s

:::ourt den ied

the

Rio Grande now c 1 ai ms that the r i il ing 01 i summary
requires a new ti: ial
However,
j ..- *

any

»• :::: t:

a t:

motion,
judgment

See Brief of Appellant f a t I 'C ii i i: 111.,
error

in

the

rul I ng

on

summary

A t t:::i: :i a ] , t I: :i = j t ldge i: ei re i: sed I: :i :i s ea r

i€ summary judgment issues• Specificall y , the

positi c:

judge instructed the jury thati
Under
U tal i
] aw
the
• :i Itimate
determination regarding right c f w a y and
crossing design and crossing warning and
safety devices
i s placed under the
control
of
the Utah
Department
of
Transportation.
You m a y n o t therefore
find either defendant railroad negligent
based upon any defects which m i g h t exist
w i t h respect to the design, of the
1600' South crossing or based upon any
problems y o u m a y perceive in the lack of
traffic
warning
device|s
at
the
1600 South crossing
.
(If 7 3 7 j

In

-mid i ! 11 ii

I i i I In

I ( i,' e e | U I m . |

i n s I i i.u "I i i in • , I i

Grande made a m o t i o n for a directed v e r d i c t on the very same

issue.

(R. 1069) .

(R. 1073-1074.)

The trial court granted that motion.

Specifically, the trial court ruled that:

Well, the Court has ruled and is
going to rule that with respect to the
ultimate obligation of putting safety
devices, whether it be stop signs,
flashers, whatever that the ultimate
responsibility for that lies with the
Department of Transportation.
(R. 1073.)

Thus, there can be no error because Rio Grande got
everything

it wanted.

The

only

difference

is

rulings came at a later stage of the trial.
granting

the

identical

law

summary
in

the

judgment, the
form

of

jury

judge

that

the

Instead of

gave

the

instructions

same

and

a

directed verdict.
Therefore, we believe that it is not necessary for
this Court to rule on the merits of the summary judgment
rulings.

Nevertheless, this Court might be

inquire

into the merits of the summary

inclined

to

judgment ruling.

Therefore, Gleave has prepared a response to the substance
of

those

arguments.

Since

those

arguments

are

only

of

peripheral interest, and since they may not be necessary to
decide

this

appendix.

appeal,

they

are

(See Exhibit C.)
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contained

in

a

separate

POINT IV.
ANY ERROR RELATING TO
WOODARD'S TESTIMONY HAS
BEEN WAIVED.
A.

Any Error in Receiving the Evidence was Waived.
The story of Willis Wcoda|rd is a strange saga.

However, it is really a "sideshow" that doesn't affect the
trial in one way or another.
Woodard
Gleave.
didn't

was

(R. 1779.)
actually

in

the

engine

when

the

train hit

However, Woodarcft wasn't looking, so he
see

the

collision.

(R. 1779-1780.)

Nevertheless, he was a direct witneiss to some surrounding
circumstances such as blowing the whistle, (R. 1781-1782);
4
how hard the brakes were set, (R. 178| 1) ; stopping distance,
(R. 1782); and certain conversation$ with Gleave after the
accident, (R. 1784-1787) .
Gleave called Woodard as la witness.

During the

direct examination, Rio Grande made a motion to terminate
further examination of Woodard.

Gleave vigorously objected.

However, the court granted Rio Grange's motion and excused
Woodard.

(R. 1801 and 1807-1808.)
It is crucial to note that Rio Grande did not move

to strike Woodard's testimony.
the testimony.

—
An expert
distance.

Nor,, did the court strike

The court's specific ruling was that:

might

compute

15

spepd

based

on

stopping

I am going to preclude any further
testimony by this witness, Mr. DeBry.
(R. 1808, emphasis added.)

For purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary
to decide whether the judge's ruling was correct.5 No
objection was made to the evidence after it was received.
Rio Grande's only objection was to excuse the witness before
he testified further.
made.

No motion to strike the testimony was

Cf. Scott v. Scott, 430 P.2d

(Utah 1967).

580, 19 Utah 2d 267

Thus, Rio Grande got exactly what it asked

for.

—
Rio Grande's reason for seeking to terminate the
examination was unique. Rio Grande claimed that Woodard (an
eyewitness) should not be able to testify because he had in
some respects changed his story. (See entire colloquy at R.
1788-1804.) However, Rio Grande has offered no authority
for that unusual position. The purpose of a trial is to get
to the truth; a trial is cloaked with various safeguards to
promote that end; e.g., the jury, the oath, cross-examination,
etc. We find no case in anglo-saxon jurisprudence where a
witness has been prevented from testifying because his
veracity was in question. Rather the reverse is true. If
his veracity is in question., you haves a trial.
Rio Grande points to an exchange of letters between
Woodard and the Rio Grande attorney. (Exhibit N to Brief of
Appellant.) Rio Grande argues that Woodard was likely to
perjure himself. That is mere speculation. It is just as
likely that Exhibit N was Woodard's way of saying that he
was finally ready to tell the truth.
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B.

Any Error in Arguing the Evidence was Waived.
Rio Grande complains that Gleave should rot have

commented on Woodard's testimony in iclosing argument.

Here

is the disputed argument:
I will
just Very briefly
mention a comment on a couple of things
Mr. Richman said; that Mr. IBurton didn't
recall blowing the whistle.
That is
true. He forgot Mr. Woodard. Remember
Mr. Woodard said—what is 4- quarter of a
mile in yards?
Mr. Woqdard
said—I
said, 'When did he blow the whistle?'
And he said, fl think three hundred
yards.' And I said, 'Coulg it have been
as short as two hundred ydrds?' And he
said, 'Yes, maybe two hundred yards.'
And that is less than a quarter of a
mile.
(R. 1151-1152.)
If Rio Grande did not like that comment, it should
have immediately objected.

If the Objection was valid, the

Court could have made a curative instruction.
did not object.

Rio Grande

It did not move fori a mistrial.

alleged error is waived.

Thus, the

Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd

W. Keller Corp., 392 P.2d 620, 15 Utah 2d 318 (Utah 1964);
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d

491

(Utah 1980);

Sanders v.

Cassity, 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978).
C.

Woodard's Testimony was not Necessary to the Verdict.
Finally, the

jury

could

have

reached

conclusion with or without Woodard's testimony.
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the

same

According

to the expert audiologist, it wouldn't matter how far back
the whistle had sounded.

The vegetation and terrain soak up

the sound.

Therefore, the sound would not be

(R. 1460.).

loud enough to serve as a warning until about 3 seconds
before

impact.

(See

Plaintiff's

Exhibit

35.)

At

that

point, it is too late for the driver to take evasive action.
(R. 1593.)
Thus, the testimony of Woodard

(about when the

whistle was sounded) is not necessary to the verdict.

The

jury verdict can be fully supported on the basis of the
audiologist1s
result.

expert

Since

grounds, there

the

testimony
verdict

is no

can

reversible

Golden Motel, 428 P.2d

655

which
be

reached
sustained

error.

the
on

same
other

See, Miller

(N.M. 1967).

v.

Cf. Wheeler v.

Jones, 431 P.2d 985, 19 Utah 2d 392 (Utah 1967).

POINT V.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD TO SUPPORT A SEAT BELT
INSTRUCTION.
At
instruction.

trial,

Rio

Grande

asked

for

a

seat

belt

Specifically, Rio Grande wanted an instruction

that failure to use a seat belt could be considered on
mitigation of damages.

The trial court refused to give the

18

instruction.

Rio Grande appeals froin that refusal.

(Brief

of Appellant, at Point V.)
A.

The Law in Other Jurisdictions.
A

rather

lively

debate

is

raging

around

country with respect to these seat belt instructions.

the
A

clear majority of the jurisdictions jrefuse to give the seat
belt instruction.

See, e.g.:

Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 425 So.2d
1147 (Fla. App. 1982);
Polyard v. Terry, 372 A.2d 378 (N.J. 1977);
Talpin v. Clark, 626 P.2d 1:198 (Kan. 1981);
Britton v. Doehring, 242 So-.2d 666 (Ala. 1970);
Nash v. Kamrath, 521 P.2d 4 61 (Ariz. 1974);
Fischer v. MooTe, 517 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1973);
Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967);
McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 20 (D.C. App. 1976);
Hampton v. State Hwy. CommJ 498 P.2d 236
(Kan. 1972);
Ramankewitz v. Black, 167 It.W.2d 606 (Mich. 1969) ;
Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.id 293 (Mo. 1970);
Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 544 P.2d
719 (N.M. 1975);
Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968);
Roberts v. Bohn, 269 N.E.2d 53, Revd. on other
grounds 279 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1971);
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d
48 (Okla. 1976);
Stallcup v. Taylor, 463 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. 1978);
Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 492
*~~ P.2d
~ ~" 1030
(Wash 1972);
Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974) .
Thomas V.Hev>sor) ^ q s P - ^ 41 <?(jM. Kei.Ws).
However, a minority of jurisdictions have reached
the opposite conclusion.
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Seey e.g.;
Hale v. Cravens, 263 N,E.2d 593 (111. App. 1970);
Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974);
Jones v. Daguef 166 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1969) (By
implication).

B.

Utah Case Law on the Seat Belt Issue.
This issue has never been squarely considered in

Utah.

Rio Grande relies solely on Acculog Inc. v. Peterson,

692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984).

However, Acculog has nothing at

all to do with the seat belt instruction.
g
Grande refers to a footnote in the case.

—
The entire text of
opinion is as follows:

the

footnote

Presumably, Rio
However, that

in the

concurring

Assume:
X driving a car, and Y, driving a
motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not wearing
a helmet. The jury finds X is 60 percent liable
for causing the accident [the "injury" under §
78-27-37] making Y, the motorcyclist, 40 percent
liable for causing the accident. The jury also
finds Y would have avoided 60 percent of his
injuries [damages] if he had worn a helmet; X is
40 percent liable for causing Y's [damages]. Y
proves $100,000 in damages. On the basis of these
findings, the $100,000 award should be reduced by
40 percent, which accounts for Y's contributing to
the cause of the accident. Hence, the award is
diminished to $60,000.
The $60,000 should now be reduced to the extent
that Y's [damages] would have been [avoided] had
he worn a helmet, i.e., 60 percent.
This
adjustment leaves a total award of $24,000.
Acculog Inc., at 121-122, n. 2.
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footnote was

a concurring

opinion

by

a

single

justice.

Therefore, that single footnote doe^ not establish the law
of this jurisdiction.
C,

The Requirement for Expert Testimony.
In this case, it is not nectessary for the Court to

adopt—or

reject—the

seat

belt

instruction.

The

trial

court judge properly refused the instruction because there
was no expert evidence to support the instruction.
Those few jurisdictions which adopt the seat belt
instruction
major

always

argument

require

expert

against the

testimony.

seat b£lt

issue

Indeed, a
is that it,

" . . . would lead to a veritable bjattle of experts as to
what injuries would or would not ha^e been avoided had the
plaintiff been wearing a belt."

Aitiend v. Bell, 570 P. 2d

138,

R^le 702, Utah

143

(Wash.

1977);

Compare

Rules of

Evidence.
In Truman v. Vargas, 275 C4I. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 373 (1969) , the court ruled tljiat, " . . . it was not
for the nonexpert minds to determine what the consequences
to Truman would have been if he had fyeen using a seat belt."
80 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
In Barry v. Coca Cola Cd. , 239 A.2d
1967) , the

court

held

that

failurje to

273

introduce

(N.J.
expert

testimony on the seat belt issue wou^d result in the "purest
kind of speculation."

239 A.2d at 2^6.
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In Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974),
the court adopted the seat belt defense.
court specifically
See also:

Nevertheless, the

required the use of expert testimony.

Foley v. City of West Allis, 335 N.W.2d 824, 831

( w i s . I Q R 3 ) * J Wassett v»> Ha<wV>l\vi x

^ 3 A, 2d 010(cow*. W&S).
D.

Rio Grande's Failure to Produce an Expert.
The seat belt issue is an affirmative defense.

Thus, Rio Grande has the burden of proof issue.

Spier v.

Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167 (N.Y. 1974). Pratt v. Board of
Education of Uintah School Dist., 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977).
Compare Rule 12(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rio Grande

relies

on very

support its seat belt theory.
p. 41.

sketchy

evidence

to

See Brief of Appellant at

However, Rio Grande offered no expert testimony at

all to support its seat belt theory.
Gleave anticipates that Rio Grande will claim that
the treating doctor (Mendenhall) was an expert and that his
testimony

would

satisfy

the

requirement

for

expert

testimony.
Dr.
dirty,

and

Mendenhall
that

such

testified

dirty

hitting the asphalt pavement.

wounds

that
are

(R. 1210.)
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the wounds

were

consistent

with

That is really

the extent of Dr. Mendenhall's expert testimony.

There is

no testimony to separate which injuries were from hitting
the

train,

pavement.

and

which

injuries

w£re

from

hitting

the

Indeed, there is no testimony as to what the

injuries would have been if Gleave Had been wearing a seat
belt.

For all we know, his neck may have been broken if he

had been wearing a seat belt.

Of course, the doctor could

not testify on any of those issues because he was a medical
doctor—not a physicist or accident Reconstruction expert.
A case in point is Heiser |v. Chastain, 285 N.E.2d
601, 604 (111. App. 1972).

There th^ court stated:

However, we find a more ba^ic defect, is
that the record fails to establish by
competent evidence that the damages
might have been mitigated i[f a seat belt
had been used.
[Citations omitted.]
The only evidence relating!to this point
is a statement by Donald Chastain that
the space between the front and back
seats of the cab was about 30 inches;
testimony of plaintiff, Bertha Heiser,
that when the cab hit the| car in front
of it, she grabbed for something to hang
onto because she felt thai: the cab was
going to tip over, and she wanted to
prevent being thrown from the seat; and
a statement by Dr. Dennis Fancsali,
plaintiff's examining physician, that if
there was a force sufficient to cause a
fracture from a blow, whether her trunk
was immobilized or not would have little
effect.
This is insufficient to show
that plaintiff's injuries would have
been mitigated had she b^en wearing a
seat belt, or to show the! extent which
they would have been mitigated.
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A similar result was reached in Bentzler v. Braun,
149 N.W.2d 626, 641 (Wis. 1967), where the court stated:
The only witness offered was an
orthopedic
surgeon,
who,
although
qualified in his chosen profession, did
not purport to be able to testify what
effect the use of seat belts might have
had in this particular case. The record
supports the trial court's determination
that there was no proof whatsoever to
show that Janet Bentzler1s injuries were
caused or aggravated by the failure to
use the seat belts. In the absence of
credible evidence by one qualified to
express the opinion of how the use or
nonuse of seat belts would have affected
the particular injuries, it is improper
for the court to permit the jury to
speculate on the effect that seat belts
would have had.

E.

Rio Grande's Failure to Plead the Seat Belt Defense.
In any

pleaded.

case, the

(R. 355, et seq.)

of Civil Procedure.
any

expert

defense was

never

Compare Rule 12(b) Utah Rules

Gleave made a timely motion to preclude

testimony

(R. 1686-1691.)

seat belt

based

on

the

failure

to

The court reserved its ruling.

plead.

(R. 1691.)

However, the issue never arose at trial because Rio Grande
failed to introduce any expert testimony.
to

make

any

subsequent

motion

to

amend

Rule 15(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Rio Grande failed
pursuant

to

POINT VI.
GLEAVE WAS ENTITLED Tp PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ONL LOST
EARNING CAPACITY. |7
Utah statutes provide for prejudgment interest on
special damages:
In all actions brought to recover
damages for personal injuries . . . it
shall be lawful for plaintiff in the
complaint to claim interest on special
damages . . . and it shall be the duty
of the Court in entering judgment for
plaintiff in that action, io add to the
amount of damages assesed bv the verdict
of the jury . . . 8% per annum from the
date of the occurrence of the act.
Section 78-27-44, Utah) Code Ann.
The

jury

answered

special

interrogatories

as

follows (R. 767):
A.

Past medical expenses

B.

Future medical expenses

22,540.00

C.

Past lost wages

20,000.00

D.

Loss of future earnings and
earning capacity

275,000.00

General damages to include
pain and suffering and
loss of enjoyment ofi life

50,000.00

E.

$

56,000.00

II
Points I to VI, above, are all in reply to Rio Grande's
opening brief.
However, Gleave ha[s cross-appealed on two
issues—prejudgment interest and punitive damages. Points VII
and VIII constitute Gleavefs opening points on the CrossAppeal. See this Court's Order of January 30, 1984, attached
as Exhibit D.
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F.

Reasonable value of
Robert Gleave's automobile
on the date of the collision

Based

on

this

jury

verdict,

the

1,600.00
$425,140,00

trial

judge

allowed prejudgment interest on past lost wages and past
medical expenses.

(R. 802.)

However, the court refused

prejudgment interest on past lost wages (item D, above).
Thus, the issue is whether lost earning capacity
constitutes "special damages."

If so, the statute should be

followed.
This issue was addressed in the case of Cohn v.
J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 537 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1975).
. . . [I]t is equally well settled
that diminished earning capacity
from a personal injury is special
damages . . . .
The policy of such prejudgment interest statutes
is as follows:
The purpose of awarding prejudgment
interest is that money is worth less the
later it is received.
Therefore, in
order
to make
a plaintiff whole,
prejudgment interest is necessary to
compensate plaintiff for the loss of the
use of the money from the date of injury
until the date of judgment.
Conversely, prejudgment
interest
deprives a defendant of unjust enrichment resulting from the use of money
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which actually belongs to jthe plaintiff
from
the
date
of
injury, thereby
!
encouraging settlement.
American Nat. Watermattress Corp.
v. Manville, 642 P.jd 1330, 1343
(Ala. 1982) .

Thus, an award of prejudgment interest on Gleave's
lost earning capacity would be with|in both the letter and
the spirit of the Utah statute.

POINT VII
THE LOWER COURT ERI^ED BY
DISMISSING GLEAVEfS CLAIM
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
Gleave's Complaint included a claim for punitive
damages.

At the close of Gleave's direct case, the court

dismissed the claim for punitive damages.

Therefore, the

punitive damage issue did not go t0 the jury.

(R. 1355.)

Gleave has cross-appealed on this is^ue.
A.

Factual Basis for Punitive Damages.
The

hazardous.

conditions

this

grossing

are

extremely

(See Point I A, above.)

This

dangerous

outskirts of Springville.
residents

of

of

one

crossing

was

located

on

the

The crossing was used by the

residential

subdivision.

(R.

1321.)

Moreover, it appears that the crossing was in the middle of
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a moderately built-up section of town and that the crossing
o

would, therefore, draw a moderate amount of traffic.
Rio
condition.
regular

Grande

was

fully

aware

of

this

dangerous

To begin with, the railroad is inspected on a

basis

by

employees

of Rio Grande.
(R. 1326.)
9
Indeed, the division engineer of Rio Grande traveled over

that crossing between once each week and once each month for
ten years.

(R. 1329.)

Finally, Rio Grande's agents met with officers of
the State of Utah to inspect this very crossing in 1974.
(R. 1236, 1237.)
recommended

to

After that official inspection, it was
install

temporary

stop

flashing lights could be installed.
B.

signs

until

red

(R. 1241.)

Rio Grande's Failure to Take Remedial Steps.
Notwithstanding

the

grave

danger,

Rio

Grande

continued to operate with absolute disregard for the safety
of motorists.
respect

to

(R. 1333.)

Rio Grande has no rules or regulations with

safety

procedures

for

such

blind

crossings.

For example, the railroad does not even consider

—
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 8. Defendant has claimed that
the crossing was on an, "infrequently traveled, country
road."
(Brief of Appellant, at p. 4.) That statement is
very misleading as it was based on a 1974 traffic count.
(R. 1244.) As Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 shows, there has been
an enormous buildup in that area over the past decade.

—
The Division Engineer is in charge of all the trackage,
buildings and bridges. (R. 1328.)
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blind

crossings

in

setting

train

speeds,

(R.

1334.)

Indeed, Rio Grande has no rules or regulations or standards
at

all

with

crossings.

respect

to

automobile

safety

at

railroad

(R. 1338.)

The only protective measurie taken by Rio Grande
was to provide a stop sign in 1979 or 1980.

(R. 1323.)

However, Rio Grande was put on notic^ that such a stop sign
would

not

be

effective.

Specifically/

the

Utah

County

Surveyor advised Rio Grande in 1976 t^iat:
Your suggestion for stop signs has
been discussed by the County Commission
and the Road Department. It was their
feeling that the railroad c bmpany in the
past, had been granted thp license to
put these stop signs up at ^our expense.
They see no reason to changb this policy
and therefore this letter is your
authority to put up stop 'signs if you
care to do so. It is also) [their
feeling
the
:hat very few people will pay any
attention to them.Howevbr, it would
place the responsibility on the driver
if he violated the stop jsign and was
involved in an accident
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12|.
[Emphasis added.]
A jury could reasonably irifer from this evidence
that

Rio

safety.

Grande

acted

in

reckles^

disregard

for

human

Apparently, Rio Grande's s£>le purpose in placing

the stop sign was to provide legal protection—and not to
avoid accidents.
This

advice

from

the Uta^h County

Surveyor was

consistent with administrative reguljations of the State of
Utah:

29

Stop signs should not be installed
indiscriminately
at
all
unprotected
crossings. The allowance of stop signs
at all such crossings would eventually
breed contempt for both law enforcement
and disobedience to the sign's command
stop. Stop signs may only be used at
selected rail highway grade crossings
after their need has been determined by
a detailed traffic engineering study.
Such studies should consider approach
speeds, sight distance restrictions,
volumes, accident records, etc.
This
application of stop signs should be an
interim use period during which plans
for lights, gates or other means of
control are being prepared,,
R. 1602. [Emphasis added.]
The

red

flashing

light

(R. 1241) , has never been installed!

recommended

in

1974

The "temporary" stop

sign has existed for over a decade.
C.

Punitive Damages Railroad Crossing Cases
from Foreign Jurisdictions.
Foreign jurisdictions have not hesitated to allow

punitive damages where railroads have carelessly maintained
dangerous crossings.
See;
Poole v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co.,
638 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1982);
Hazelwood v. 111. Central Gulf R.R.,
450 N.E.2d 1199 (111. App. 1983);
Brown v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 703 F.2d
1050 (8th Cir. 1983);
Matkovich v. Penn Central Transportation
Co. , 431 N.E.2d 652 (Ohio 1982);
Stromquist v. Burlington Northern Inc.,
444 N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. 1983);
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Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613
P.2d 982 (Mont. 1980) ;
Lowery v. Seabord Coastlinel R.R. Co.,
241 S.E.2d 158 (S. Cal. l|978) .
J=S5££LJQJLC^^
The

common

theme

in

all

of

"conscious disregard for public safety."
p. 1116.
follows:

For

example,

Poole,

these

cases

is a

Stromquist, id. at

id.| states

the

rule

as

"The jury was entitled to infer that [the rail-

road] had knowledge of the potential danger . . . and that
it was consciously indifferent to i^he rights, welfare and
safety of such persons affected by the danger."
D.

Utah Case Law on Punitive Damages,
Utah has recently allowed punitive damages in a

wide variety of circumstances:
Branch v. Western Petroleum, 657 P.2d
267 (Utah 1982) (pollution of culinary
water);
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Cd. v. Isom,
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) '(interference
with contract);
First Security Bank of Utah v, J.B.J.
Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982)
(wrongful attachment);
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.^d 37 (Utah
1980) (sexual assault);
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah
1975) (property dispute) ,i
Terry v» Z:*Tctfls Cooperative Mercantile
Institution,iU 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979)
(false arrest).

— I t appears that this Court may have retreated from the
imposition of punitive damages ±r|i false arrest cases.
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah
1984) .
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In

summary,

this

Court

has

permitted

punitive

damages for such problems as property disputes, interference
with contract, wrongful attachment, water pollution, etc.
Isn't it much more appropriate to impose punitive damages
where human life and safety are involved?

As this Court has

stated:
Furthermore, punitive damages should be
awarded only when they will accomplish a
public objective not accomplished by the
award of compensatory damages . . . .
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital
Corp., 675 P.2d 1179, 1187 (Utah
1983) .
It is clearly a public objective to save human lives at
railroad crossings.

E.

Rio Grande Cannot Avoid Punitive Damages Because of the
Preemption Argument.
Rio Grande will probably

power

to

devices.

install

red

lights

or

other

signal

(See Brief of Appellant, at Point III.)
However,

Assume

flashing

argue that it had no

arquendo

authority

to

that

that

install

is
the
red

nonetheless, have reduced

completely
State

of

lights«

beside

the point.

Utah

has

exclusive

Rio

Grande

could,

the speed of its trains.

Rio

Grande could, nonetheless, have burned away the weeds which
obstructed

vision.

Other

courts

have

damages under these same circumstances.
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allowed

punitive

See:
Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d 982
(Mont. 1980)• (Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973
does not lessen in any way cominon law duties to make
a safe crossing.)
Stromquist v. Burlington Norther^, Inc., 444 N.E.2d
1113 (111. App. 1983) . (Orders or proceedings of
the Illinois Commerce Commission do not change
railroad's common law duties.)
Indeed, if the State of Utah has failed to install
red flashing lights, Rio Grande has more reason to reduce
train speed and burn away weeds.
F.

The Issue of Punitive Damages Can Be Tried Separately,
and There is No Need to Retry th^ Liability Issues.
Gleave has received a jury verdict that he is 0%

negligent

and

that

Ric

Grande

is

100% negligent.

The

preferred procedure is to affirm th&t verdict, and remand
for the sole purpose of a new trial on punitive damages.
See e.g., Fiberboard Paper Prod. Cor^. v. East Bay Union of
Mach., 39 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964), where the court stated:
An appellate court has power to remand
cases for retrial on a single issue such
as damages (citations omitted), and this
power includes a retrial oiji the limited
issue of exemplary damages^
(citations
omitted), id. at p. 100.
See also, Olin Corp. v. Dyson, 678 S.W.2d 650

(Tex. App.

1984); Alhino v. Starr, 169 Cal. Rptr,. 136; 112 Cal. App. 3d
158 (1981); Rosner v« Sears Roebuck, L68 Cal. Rptr. 237; 110
Cal. App. 3d 740 (1980) .
33

Indeed, it is not uncommon to bifurcate the issues
of compensatory damages and punitive damages.

Rupert v.

Sellers,

Vollertson

368

N.Y.S.2d

904

(1975);

James

Assts., Inc. v. John Nothnagle, Inc.,

P.

369 N.Y.S.2d

267

(1975); Newton v. Yates, 353 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. App. 1976);
Chupp v. Henderson, 216 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 1975).
Punitive
12.04.

Damages

Law

& Practice, Callaghan

See also,

1984

ed., §

If the punitive damage claim can be bifurcated into

a separate trial, it follows a. priori that remand for a
trial on the limited issue of punitive damages would be
appropriate.

POINT VIII.
GLEAVE SHOULD NOT BE DRAGGED INTO
ANY DISPUTE (ON CONTRIBUTION) BETWEEN RIO GRANDE AND THE STATE OF
UTAH.
Rio

Grande

improperly dismissed.

claims

that

the

State

of Utah was

Rio Grande claims that a trial is

necessary to determine the relative fault between Rio Grande
and the State of Utah.
The

State

joint tort-feasors.

(See Brief of Appellant at p. 49.)
of
Gleave

Utah

and

Rio

(the injured

Grande

party) may

are
sue

whichever tort-feasor he chooses; and Gleave can collect the
entire judgment from either tort-feasor:

34

When there is a disproportion of
fault among joint tort-feasors to an
extent that it would rendejr inequitable
an equal distribution by contribution
among them of their common liability,
the relative degrees of [fault of the
joint tort-feasors shall he considered
in determining their pro rata shares,
solely for the purpose of determining
their
rights of contribution
among
themselves, each remaining severally
liable to the injured petson for the
whole injury as at common law.
Section 78-27-40(2), ijtah Code Ann.
•

*

*

Nothing in this act shall effect:
(1) The common-law liability of the
several
joint tort-feasors
to have
judgment recovered, and payment made,
from them individually by the injured
person for the whole injury.
Section 78-27-41(1) Utjah Code Ann.
After Gleave (the injured #arty) recovers from Rio
Grande (a joint tort-feasor), Rio Grfende has a right to sue
the State of Utah for contribution:
The right of contribution shall
exist among joint tort-fdasors, but a
joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled
to a money judgment for contribution
until he has, by payment, discharged the
common liability or mo^re than his
pro rata share thereof.
Section 78-27-39, Utaljt Code Ann.
Note that Rio Grande does not have any right of
contribution until after payment of! the original judgment.
Thus, Rio
Gleave.

Grande

should

first pay

the

judgment

against

Thereafter, Rio Grande cani pursue its claims for

contribution against the State of Ut^h.
35

Rio Grande now wants to drag Gleave back into a
three-way retrial

(Gleave/Rio Grande/State of Utah).

Rio

Grande relies on Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. y
679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984) .
However, Jensen deals with a different issue and
is inapposite in this case.

Note especially that a jury has

already decided that Gleave is 0% negligent.

What remains

is only the dispute between Rio Grande and the State of Utah
with respect to dividing the 100% fault.
by a separate trial on contribution.

That can be done

See Unigard Insurance

Company v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344 (Ut. 1984).
CONCLUSION
The jury verdict should be affirmed.
should remand for two limited purposes:

This Court

First, to assess

prejudgment interest on lost earning capacity.

Second, for

a trial on the issue of punitive damages.
If Rio Grande has any claim for contribution from
the State of Utah, that should be resolved in a separate
trial between the two tort-feasors.
Respectfully
^

^

/

submitted,

this

&

day

of

. 1985.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent and CrossAppellan£>>Robert L. gleave
By:
ROBERT J. -DEBRY
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true and correct

copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent and
Cross-Appellant Robert L. Gleave, (Gleave vs. Rio Grande,
Case

No. 20166,

Case

No.

20300,

Consolidated

Case

No. 20300) , were mailed via U.S. Mailj, postage prepaid, this
day of

$*^£w.

1985, to the following:

E. Scott Savage, Esq.
Michael F. Richman, Esq.
Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY!
Attorneys for the Rio Grande and Utahj
Railway Company
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400

Paul Warner, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utdh
Department of Transportation, State! of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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Exhibit A

ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TJHE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COjUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J.
DEBRY IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL

Civil No. 62912
)
J (Judge Cullen Y. Christens*
)
)|

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

My name is Robert J. peBry.

I give the following

testimony under oath:
1.

During the voir dire, the Court asked for a

list of witnesses;
2.

I read a partial fListing of witnesses;

3.

Some

time

thereafter,

(but

during

the

voir

dire) my legal assistant, Deann4 Richards, reminded me that
I

had

skipped

the

name

of

Dr*

Mendenhall.

I

thereupon

advised the Court and the venire of Dr. Mendenhall f s name.

4.

x read

the

partxal

aire prepared by Mr. Roundy.

transcript

of

the

voir

The colloquay regarding Dr.

Mendenhaii was not included.

I thereupon called Mr. Roundy

re order a complete copy of the voir dire.
5.

Mr. Roundy informed me that he had only taken

£es on a portion of the voir dire.
^

DATED this

/j

day

1984.

ROBE
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /j/~
J^UUc*X>

£ay

1984,

6<J^
NOTARY BOBLICy .

Residing at; >ddM:

S\

>AJCL

Ut^,±^UhL

My Commssion Expires;

i
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Exhibit B

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
REGARDING JURY SELECTION
Rio Grande claims that therfc was error in the jury
selection with respect to juror Arcjryle.

Gleave contends

that there is no record to support such claims.

In the

absence of a complete record, this Cburt should affirm the
verdict.

(See Point II of main brief[)
However, this Court might be inclined to look

beyond the procedural defect to examine the merits.

Since

it is not likely that this Court will reach the merits, this
memorandum is included only as an appfendix.

POINT ONE.
DR. MENDENHALL WAS INTRODUCED
DURING OPENING STATEMENTS.
Rio Grande complains that hr. Mendenhall was not
introduced during the voir dire. tiven if that is true,
Dr. Mendenhall was introduced to th|e jury during opening
statements:
Doctor Mendenhall, an orthopedic doctor, will cofne in to
describe those injuries, but just
briefly let me explain the nature of
his injuries . . . .
(R. 1705.)

Rio Grande could easily have objected at the time
of

the

opening

statement.

At

that early

stage

of

the

trial, the Court had various alternatives to cure the error.
However, Rio Grande did not object.

Instead, Rio Grande

waited to see what type of verdict it would get.
the fact, Rio Grande complains.

Now, after

However it is too late.

The error, if any, has been waived. Coke v. Timby, 19 2 P.
624 (Utah 1920); White v. Newman, 348 P.2d 343 (Utah 1960).

POINT TWO.
RIO GRANDE RELIED ON DR.
MENDENHALL'S ANTICIPATED
TESTIMONY.
Rio Grande was fully informed about Dr. Mendenhall's role in the trial.
Dr. Mendenhall's

Indeed, Rio Grande had

deposition.

Prior

to

the

taken

opening

statements, defendant argued certain motions to the Court.
Those

motions

were

based

in

part

on

Dr. Mendenhall's

anticipated testimony:
MR. O'HARA:
[Arguing for Rio Grande]
And the doctor in this case will testify
that there was substantial dirt and
splinters, that sort of thing, in the
man's—Mr. Gleave's leg and elbow and
knee and ankle.
(R. 1688.)

—

A correct objection would be something like this:
Defendant
objects
to
any
comment
regarding testimony from a witness who
was
not
introduced
on
voir
dire.
Defendant will further move to exclude
the testimony of Dr. Mendenhall if and
when that is offered.
2

Thus,

on

one

hand,

Rio

Dr. Mendenhall1s expected testimony

Grande

relies

its own motions.

on
On

the other hand, Rio Grande complains that no one knew about
Dr. Mendenhall.

That is simply not f|air.

Rio Grande cannot

have it both ways!
POINT THREE.
DR. MENDENHALL'S TESTIMONY
WAS UNCONTRADICTED.
Dr.
uncontradicted.
injuries.

The

Mendenhall's

testimony

Dr. Mendenhall
injuries

were

was

siimply
essentially

completely

described
broken

the

bones.

There was certainly no claim that th^ bones were not really
broken!

In a very similar case, this Court has held that

there was no showing of bias:
After being
returned
to
their
families by another camper in the area,
the girls were taken to the| Brigham City
Hospital where they were examined by
Dr. David
Carlquist.
At
trial
Dr. Carlquist
testified
[as to his
examination].
* * *

This appeal focuses Solely on the
voir dire examination.
One of the
veniremen . . . indicated tjiat he
was acquainted with . . .
Dr. Carlquist . . . .
* * *

The trial judge concluded that [the
juror's] impressions of -qhe witnesses
were not so "strong and deep" as to
constitute bias. Although it may have
been better to have excused [the juror]

3

for cause, we find no error in leaving
him on the panel. This is particularly
so when the nature of the testimony
offered
by
Carlquist . . . is
considered.
Their credibility was not
questioned and their testimony is not
crucial to the prosecutor's case.
State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311
(Utah 1983);
See also: Woodring v. U.S.,
376 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1967);
Lamphere v. Agnew, 607 P.2d 1164
(N.M. 1975).
The Oregon Supreme Court has considered

a case

identical to this one. Bradlev v. Gudeman, 543 P. 2d 1045
(Or.

1975) .

In Bradley, the Court held that paintiff did

not have the sole duty to introduce witnesses to the jury.
Thusf

nothing

stopped

Rio

Grande

from

Dr. Mendenhall to the prospective jurors .

introducing

Nothing stopped

Rio Grande from asking questions about Dr. Mendenhall during
the voir dire.
CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct in ruling that a new
trial was not required because of juror Argyle.

4

Exhibit C

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM REGARDING
STATE PREEMPTION SIGNS AND SIGNALS
AT RAILROAD C R O S S E S .
Rio Grande's memorandum argues that the State of
Utah has exclusive jurisdiction (preemption) over signs and
signals at railroad crossings,
Gleave has responded
resolved
brief.

on procedural

that! these

grounds.

issues may be

See Point

III of main

However, this Court might be inclined to look beyond

the procedural defect to examine th£ merits.

Since it is

not likely that the Court will even reach the merits, this
memorandum is included only as an appendix.

POINT ONE.
ANY ERROR IN THE TJRIAL
COURT IS MOOT.
There was indeed an error in the trial court.
However, that error favored Rio Grande.

The trial court

erred by refusing to instruct the juify that Rio Grande had a
common law duty to install appropriate safety signals at the
railroad crossing.

(R. 1901-1903.)

The other side of the

coin is that the Court erred by instructing the jury that
the State of Utah had exclusive 4uty to install safety
signals at the railroad crossing.

(R. 737.)

The trial

court apparently believed that the diity for signs and

signals had to fall either on the State of Utah or Rio
Grande.

The trial court failed to consider the possibility

that the duties were overlapping.
However the error is moot.

It really makes no

difference whether Rio Grande or the State of Utah had the
duty to install signs and signals at the crossing because
that issue was never presented

to the jury.

The issue

presented to the jury was whether Rio Grande violated any
duties other than the duty to install signs and signals at
crossings.

Thus, the judge instructed the jury as follows:

Under
Utah
law
the
ultimate
determination regarding right of way and
crossing design and crossing warning and
safety devices is placed under the
control of the Utah Department of
Transportation. You may not therefore
find either defendant railroad negligent
based upon any defects which might exist
with respect to the design of the
1600 South crossing or based upon any
problems you may perceive in the lack of
traffic
warning
devices
at
the
1600 South crossing.
However,
irrespective
of
the
foregoing, the defendant Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad is not relieved
of any responsibility to exercise due
care when its trains approach such
crossing.
Consequently, if you find
that the configuration of the land and
other physical features in the area make
such crossing more than ordinarily
hazardous and that the warning devices
employed at the crossing were inadequate
to warn the public of the danger, you
shall determine whether the defendant
Denver & Rio grande Western Railroad
knew of or should have known of such

2

condition and whether it exercised due
care in view of all the circumstances.
The failure to exercise du|e care under
such
conditions
would
constitute
negligence.
(R. 737.)
Therefore, it makes no difference how the trial
court ruled on the issue of signs &nd signals.

The jury

decided that Rio Grande violated duties other than the duty
to install signs and signals.
POINT TWO.
THE DUTIES OF THE SfTATE OF
UTAH AND RIO GRANDE OVERLAP.
A*

The Common Law Background;
Utah has always held that railroads have common

law duties to make safe crossings.

Hobbs v. Denver & Rio

Grande Western R.R., 677 P.2d 1128 (0tah 1984);

Bridges v.

Union Pacific R.R. Co., 488 P.2d 738 26 Utah 2d 281, (1971);
Evans v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 37 Utah 431, 108 P. 638
(1910); English v. Southern Pac. Co.b 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47
(1896) .
Further, it is generally conceded that trains have
a common law duty to operate at a reasonable speed.
v.

Southern

Pac.

Co.,

171

P.

949,

1000

(Utah

Denvers
1918);

St. Louis Southwestern R.R. Co. v. feenningtons, 553 S.W.2d
436 (Ark. 1977); Runkle v. Burlingtoii Northern, 613 P.2d 982
(Mont. 1980) .

3

B.

The Statutory Background:
In addition to the common law, the legislature has

imposed a variety of duties on railroads.

Section 56-1-11,

Utah Code Ann, (1953) , provides that:
Every railroad company shcill be liable
for damages caused by its neglect to
make and maintain good and sufficient
crossings at points where any line of
travel crosses its road.
Section 41-6-19,

Utah

Code

Ann.,

requires

landowners (including railroads) to take certain precautions
for motorists:
It shall be the duty of the owner of
real property to remove from such
property any tree, plant, shrub or other
obstruction, or part thereof, which, by
obstructing the view of any driver,
constitutes a traffic hazard.
Section 41-6-95(3), Utah Code Ann., provides that
a motorist must stop at a crossing if:
A railroad train approaching within
approximately 1,500 feet of the highway
crossing emits a signal audible from
such distance . . . .

—
It is uncontested that a
crossing was the weeds growing
These weeds severely restricted a
an oncoming train.
(See Brief
Compare plaintiff's exhibits 2A,
See also, R. 1597.

4

major danger with this
on Rio Grande property.
motorist's ability to see
of Appellant, at p. 4.
2B, 2C, 2D, 2G, and 2L.

Finally, Section 56-1-14, U|bah Code Ann. , requires
trains to give an advance audible warhing:
Every locomotive shall be provided with
a bell which shall be rung! continuously
from a point not less than eighty rods
from
any . . . public
highway
grade
crossing . . . the
sounding
of
the
locomotive whistle or siren at least
one-fourth of a mile before! reaching any
grade crossing shall be deemed the
equivalent of ringing the b^ll . . . .
C.

Overlapping Duties.
As noted above, Utah has a rich background of

common law and statutory safeguards that apply to railroad
crossings.

Rio Grande urges that ajll of those safeguards

have been wiped out by virtue of Section 54-4-15, Utah Code
Ann.

See Brief of Appellant, at Poirit III C.
Gleave does not contest tljat the Utah Department

of Transportation has some authority.

However, the Utah

Department of Transportation's authority is not exclusive.
2
It overlaps with Rio Grande's common law duties, and with
other statutory duties:
Section 54-4-15(2), Utah Cqde Ann., prior to 1975,
provided that the UPSC has "exclusivd power" to regulate and
prescribe "the terms of installation,! operation, maintenance,
use and protection of each crossing . . . a public road or
highway by a railroad . . . "

(Emphasis added.)

2/
—
There is no evidence in this (record that Rio Grande
ever requested permission to install! gates or lights at the
crossing. Nor, is there any evidenc4 that the State of Utah
denied Rio Grande permission to install gates or lights at
the crossing.
5

In 1975, Section 54-4-15(2) was amended to insert
the Utah Department of Transportation in place of the Utah
Public Service Commission.
word

"exclusive"

statute.

from

the

Also, the amendment removed the
grant

of power given

in the

Instead, the U.P.S.C. was given the "exclusive

jurisdiction," by §54-4-15(4), Utah Code Ann., to resolve
disputes between the U.D.O.T. and person aggrieved by any
action of the U.D.O.T.
Other

states

have

construed

such

regulatory

schemes as follows:

Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d 982
(Mont. 1980) . (Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973
does not lessen in any way railroad's common law
duties to make a safe crossing.
Hines v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 330 N.W.2d
284 (Iowa 1983) . (State statutes setting
standards for railroad crossing safety do not
change or abrogate railroad's common law
duties.)
Stromquist v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 444
N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. 1983). (Orders or
proceedings of Illinois Commerce Comm. do not
abrogate the railroad's common law duties.)

POINT THREE.
THE STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE
CONSTRUED IN A MANNER WHICH
WOULD ABROGATE COMMON LAW
DUTIES.
If the legislature wanted to preempt all existing
common law, it should have said so.

Statutes will not be

construed to change the common law unless the language is

6

clear and explicit.

See e.g., City <pf Pensacola v. Capitol

Realty Holding Co. , 471 So.2d 687 (Fl|a. App. 1982):
(A statute designed to change the common
law must be in clear and unequivocal
terms, for the presumption is that no
change in the common law is intended
unless the statute is explicit in that
regard.)
State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 1982):
(A statute designed to change the common
law must speak in clear anid unequivocal
terms as there is a presumbtion that no
change is intended unless tfhe statute is
explicit.)
United States v. Bellard, 674 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1982).
If a common law right is td be taken
away, it must be noted clearly by
the legislature.
POINT FOUR.
RIO GRANDE'S THEORY ON APPEAL NOT
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT.
On appeal, Rio Grande now argues a new theory
never presented to the trial court.

In the trial court, Rio

Grande did ask for a ruling that the issue of signs and
signals was preempted to the State !of Utah.
Grande won that round.

In fact, Rio

However, Rio Grande did not go the

next step to claim that the duty of reducing

speed or

burning weeds was somehow preempted by the State of Utah.
See Brief of Appellant, at pp. 35-364
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Since the issue was not preserved in the trial
3
court, it may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
See, e.g., Combe v. Warrenfs Family Drive-Innsy Inc., 680
P.2d 773
1983);

(Utah 1984); County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah

Bangerter

v. Poulton, 663

P.2d

100

(Utah

1983);

Turtle Mgt. Inc. v. Haggis Mgt. Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah
1982).
CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct in denying the motion
for summary judgment.

—
Even if the issue was presented on the motion for
partial summary judgment, it was waived when Rio Grande
failed to renew the theory at trial. It would have been
especially appropriate to renew the theory at trial because
the trial court did grant a directed verdict on this very
issue. (R. 737.)
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Michael F. Richman
Patrick J. O'Hara
Attorneys for The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company and Utah
Railway Company
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
and Respondent,

vs
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellants
and Respondents

STIPULATION AND ORDER
CONSOLIDATING APPEALS &
ESTABLISHING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE
(Case No. 20166)
(Case No. 20300)
Consolidated Case No. 20300

and
THE STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant-Respondent.
PROCEDURAL STATEMENT
1.

Before final Judgment was entered by the District

Court in this action, plaintiff filed 4 Notice of Appeal on or
about August 28, 1984. After the District Court entered final
judgment, Plaintiff filed a Renewed Notice of Appeal on or
about November 1, 1984, resulting in Supreme Court Case No.

20166.

Robert L. Gleave ("Gleave") appeals from a directed

verdict entered against Gleave on Gleave's claim for punitive
damages.
2.

After the District Court entered final judgment

in this action, Defendants The Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company (the "Rio Grande") and Utah Railway Company
("Utah Railway") filed a Notice of Appeal on or about November
9, 1984, resulting in Supreme Court Case No. 20300.

The Rio

Grande and Utah Railway appeal from the judgment entered
against said defendants based on a jury verdict adverse to said
defendants.
STIPULATION
It is stipulated by the undersigned counsel of record
as follows: *
1.

The appeal docketed by Gleave (i.e., Supreme

Court Case No. 20166) may be consolidated with the appeal filed
by the Rio Grande and Utah Railway (i.e., Supreme Court Case
No. 20300), so that both appeals may be heard as part of Case
No. 20300.
2.

Within 30 days after the record on appeal is

filed in the Supreme Court, the Rio Grande and Utah Railway
shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court its Brief on
appeal.
3.

Within 30 days after service upon Gleave and

State of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") of
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the Brief filed by the Rio Grande and Utah Railway, Gleave and
UDOT shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court their
respective Briefs, provided that Gleavje and UDOT shall have 33
days if the Rio Grande's and Utah Railway's Brief is served on
Gleave and UDOT by mail.
4.

After Gleave and UDOT file their respective

Briefs, the Rio Grande and Utah Railway may serve a Reply Brief
within 30 days after service by Gleavei and UDOT of their
respective Briefs on the Rio Grande an|d Utah Railway, provided
that the Rio Grande shall have 33 days| if Gleavefs or UDOT's
Brief is served on the Rio Grande by n^ail. The Reply Brief
filed by the Rio Grande and Utah Railv^ay, if any, shall be
limited to answering any new matter s^t forth in the Briefs
filed by Gleave and UDOT.
5.

If the Rio Grande and Utah Railway file a Reply

Brief to Gleavefs Brief, then Gleave n}ay thereafter file a
Surreply Brief limited exclusively to the portion of the Rio
Grande's and Utah Railway's Reply Bri^f which pertains to
Gleave's contention that it was error for the District Court to
grant the Rio Grande's and Utah Railway's motion for a directed
verdict on the question of Gleave's c]|aim for punitive
damages.

The Surreply Brief filed by Gleave, if any, shall be

limited to answering any new matter s^t forth in the Rio
Grande's and Utah Railway's Reply Bri^f on the issue of
punitive damages.

Any Surreply Brief filed by Gleave on the
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punitive damages issue must be filed by Gleave within 30 days
after service by the Rio Grande and Utah Railway of their Reply
Brief on Gleave, provided that Gleave shall have 33 days if the
Rio Grande's and Utah Railway's Reply Brief if served on Gleave
by mail,
DATED t h i s j ^ J d a y

of December, 1984.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Michael F. Richman
Patrick J. O'Hara

»?d&XQL,
Attorneys for The Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.
and Utah Railway Company
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
DATED this V.

day of

A

ALL.

19

ROBERT J. DEBRY

Attorney for Robert/ L. Gleave
DATED this

day of

_> 19

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH
By
Paul M. Warner, Assistant
Attorney General, Attorney for
The State of Utah, Utah
Department of Transportation.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing stipulation by the parties, it
IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Supreme Court Case No. 2(^166 is hereby

consolidated with Supreme Court Case N<^. 20300, with the
surviving case number of the consolidated case being Supreme
Court Case No. 20300.
2.

The briefing schedule stipulated by the parties

at Paragraph 2 through 5 of the foregoing Stipulation is hereby
incorporated by reference and made binding upon the parties as
an Order of the Court.
DATED this

day of January, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

Justice of the Supreme Court
28970
122884
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing "Stipulation and Order Consolidating Appeals and
Establishing Briefing Schedule" was mailed, postage prepaid,
this

day of

, 19

to::

Robert J. DeBry
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Paul Warner, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Utah Department of Transportation,
State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

28970
122884
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